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Abstract
We consider a principal-agent model in which the agent may acquire costly infor-
mation about his e¤ort costs before he accepts a contract. The model departs from
the literature in two ways: (1) the information is ‘hard’ in the sense that it can be
credibly communicated, and (2) the parties are unable to commit to not renegotiate
their contract. When the cost of acquiring information is low, the optimal contract
induces information acquisition. In this case the contract is renegotiated and leaves
the agent no rent. When the information cost is higher, the optimal contract induces
the agent not to acquire information. In this case, if the cost is not too high, quantities
are ine¢cient and the agent may receive rent. If the cost is yet higher, the contract
again yields e¢cient quantities and leaves the agent no rent. These results hold also if
parties  can  commit  themselves  not  to  renegotiate.
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In many agency problems the information structure rather than being exogenous (as it is
widely assumed) is a¤ected by the interaction of the players and the incentives they face
and, therefore, it is endogenous. The principal and/or the agent may have the opportu-
nity of acquiring information about costs, revenues, etc. before entering in a contractual
relationship.
We consider a procurement model where the principal (she) hires the agent (he) and, at
the time the contract is o¤ered, none of them knows with certainty the production costs.
The agent has then the opportunity of costly acquiring information about his own costs. We
assume that the acquired information can be credibly communicated -it is hard-, but can
not be observed by a court of law -it is non-veri…able- and, therefore, cannot be contracted
upon.
The acquired information can be credibly communicated when it is the report of a re-
puted consultant …rm, or the results of some lab tests, or a statistic report, etc. In these
circumstances the agent’s acquired information can be credibly communicated to the prin-
cipal. The assumption of non-veri…ability makes sense when only the other party (but not
the court) can properly assess the validity of the information, or when it is too costly to
generate evidence that meets the standards required by a court of law.
To illustrate the assumption consider an example where the principal wants the agent to
clean and level a tract of land in a remote place (assume she has been there before). She
wants it leveled at a certain height to build on it afterwards. The agent may go and take a
look at the land and say “it is really bad, it will be very costly to clean and level it,” and the
principal has no reason to believe him (the information is soft). Or the agent may go and
take some pictures, that the principal would recognize are from his land, and the principal
could then assess the validity of the agent’s claim.
To generate evidence that can be used in court may require to certify with the local
authority that the pictures are really from the principal’s land, to have a third party to
measure the height at di¤erent points, to estimate how much extra soil is needed, etc.
1Previous literature in pre-contractual information acquisition (Crémer & Khalil, 1992,
Crémer, Khalil & Rochet, 1998a, Crémer, Khalil & Rochet, 1998b, and Kessler, 1998) fo-
cuses basically in two dimensions of the problem: the timing of the information acquisition,
whether it occurs before or after the contract o¤er is made, and the information acquisition
being productive or strategic (if the agent were to learn for free his production costs before
deciding the production level, then the costly acquisition of information before signing the
contract is said to be strategic and has no social value). This literature assumes that the
acquired information is soft and that parties can commit to avoid renegotiation.
We relax the commitment assumption and analyze the case where the acquired infor-
mation can be credibly communicated to the other party but it is non-veri…able (moreover,
we assume the acquisition of information itself is non-veri…able). We assume the agent can
acquire the information after the contract has been o¤ered, the information acquisition is
strategic, and the agent can choose to disclose it or not when the parties are about to rene-
gotiate. If the agent decides not to gather information, he will learn his type at no cost
when deciding the production level. Principal and agent will be able to renegotiate after the
agent learns his type, but the information acquired at this is stage is assumed to be soft and
therefore can not be credibly communicated at the renegotiation stage.
We may think of this situation as a process where the agent, after incurring some …xed
costs or producing a minimal quantity, learns his marginal costs. This information is assumed
to be soft and we rule out the possibility of generating hard evidence at this stage.1
1All we need to assume is that the cost of generating hard evidence at this stage is larger than the cost of
generating it before signing the contract divided by the probability of the agent being high cost type. This
will be the case whenever generating hard information or evaluating it takes some time and it is too costly
to delay the production process.
In terms of our example, if the principal needs the land clean and even to start building at a certain date
it might not be possible to delay the cleaning to take the pictures and hire a third party to estimate the
extra soil needed, send the report to the principal and go through the renegotiation process. Alternatively,
it could be too costly for the agent to delay the cleaning and leveling process simply because he has all his
workers and machinery at the place.
2Results
We derive the optimal contract the principal would o¤er as a function of the cost of
acquiring the information. In this model, the agent may choose to gather pre-contractual
information basically for two reasons: to learn his type and reject principal’s o¤er if it gives
him a negative payo¤; and to improve his situation at the renegotiation stage.
We …nd that for values of the information below a cuto¤ level, the principal will induce
the agent to acquire it. In such cases, renegotiation will take place after the agent shows the
information to the principal, and the …nal production levels will be the e¢cient ones. The
principal will choose an initial contract such that the agent acquires information and obtains
zero expected rent. Since production is going to be e¢cient after the renegotiating with hard
information, the principal will appropriate all the expected surplus of the relationship minus
the cost of acquiring the information.
For large enough values of the cost of acquiring pre-contractual information, the situation
is equivalent to the one in which the agent simply can not acquire pre-contractual information
at all. In this case, the principal will o¤er the agent a contract involving e¢cient production
levels and no expected rent for the agent.
For intermediate values of this cost, the optimal contract will induce a production level
below the e¢cient one for the high cost agent. Depending on the parameters of the model,
agent’s expected payo¤ is going to be equal to his reservation utility for any value of the cost
of acquiring information, or he can get some positive expected payo¤ for some intermediate
values of the information acquisition cost.
This result contrasts with previous results in the literature, where the agent always …nds
bene…cial to have a lower cost of acquiring pre-contractual information. As will be clear
later, this (counterintuitive?) result is directly related to the assumptions that the costly
information is hard and the agent decides to acquire it or not only after receiving the contract
o¤er.
Related Literature
Crémer and Khalil (1992) assume the agent can spend an amount ￿ to learn his marginal
3cost after the contract is o¤ered and before accepting or rejecting it. This information has no
productive value since he can learn his type at no cost after accepting the contract and before
deciding the production level. The optimal contract will induce no information acquisition
for any positive ￿: any contract inducing pre-contractual information gathering would be
strictly Pareto dominated by one that includes the option for the agent of producing zero
and paying to the principal a fraction of ￿.2 Principal’s pro…t is an increasing function in ￿
(and for large enough values he is able to extract the total surplus). Therefore, the principal
would have an incentive to increase the information acquisition costs and/or to introduce
competition between agents.
Crémer et al. (1998a) assume that the information acquisition decision by the agent is
prior to the contract o¤er (the principal can not observe this decision) and this information
acquisition is only strategic. For small values of ￿ the agent always gets the information
and the contract o¤ered by the principal is the one derived in Baron & Myerson (1982).
For large enough values he never acquires information and the optimal contract involves
e¢cient production levels and zero ex-ante rent for the agent. For intermediate values the
agent follows a mixed strategy and the principal designs two di¤erent contracts: one for the
informed agent and one for the uninformed. Depending on the speci…c parameter values,
the optimal contracts designed for the informed and uninformed more ine¢cient types may
or may not coincide. For the most e¢cient types the optimal contracts for informed and
uninformed agents always di¤er.
In Crémer et al. (1998b), unlike the previous ones, the pre-contractual information
gathering has a productive value since it is assumed that the agent will not learn his type
until the end of the game unless he spends ￿: It is assumed that the agent can acquire the
information about his type after being o¤ered the contract and before accepting or rejecting
it. Therefore, the information can help to adjust the production depending on the marginal
cost. Optimally, the principal will o¤er a contract that induces information gathering only
when the cost of acquiring is smaller than a critical value. For a small enough cost of
2If the agent spends ￿ is because he may reject the contract depending on the information.
4acquiring the information, the contract o¤ered is the same as if there were no costs at all
(the one derived in Baron & Myerson, 1982). For large enough values of ￿ the contract is
ex-ante e¢cient and gives the agent no rent. For smaller values (but above the critical value)
the optimal contract is distorted away from the ex-ante e¢cient and the agent may have a
positive rent.
Kessler (1998) assumes that before a contract is o¤ered the agent can spend some re-
sources to learn his type with a probability that depends on the expenditure level, and the
principal can observe this expenditure level but not if the agent learns his type or not. As in
Crémer et al. (1998b), it is assumed that if she doesn’t learn her type here she is not going
to learn it until payo¤s are realized, therefore the information has a productive value. The
main …nding is that, in a two-type setting, no matter how cheap is for the agent to learn her
type, she will never spend enough money to learn her type for sure. That is, she chooses
an expenditure level such that she is going to be ignorant about his type with a positive
probability. The asymmetry of information about being or not informed gives the agent a
positive rent.
Outline
In the next section the notation and the model are presented. In Section 3 the extreme
cases when the cost of acquiring information is zero and in…nite are presented. The solution
for the general case is presented in Section 4 and the robustness of the model is discussed in
Section 5. Section 6 discusses the main results and possible extensions. Proofs missing from
the text are in Appendix A.
2. The Model
The principal wants the agent to produce a certain good that she values V (q), where q is
a contractible variable (quantity or quality) and V (¢) is an increasing and strictly concave
function, with V (0) = 0, V 0(0) = 1; V 0(1) = 0.
The production cost is either C(q) = ﬂq or C(q) = ﬂq, (ﬂ > ﬂ > 0) with probabilities
… 2 (0;1) and (1 ¡ …) respectively. We denote by q¤ and q¤ the e¢cient production levels
5for each type: V 0(q¤) = ﬂ and V 0(q¤) = ﬂ:











































As mentioned, it is assumed that there is no asymmetric information at the beginning
of the game (neither the agent nor the principal knows ﬂ), but there is an asymmetry in
the possibility of acquiring information: after the principal o¤ered a contract, the agent can
learn his type at a cost ￿ ¸ 0 before accepting or rejecting the contract; while the principal
can not acquire this information.3
Once the contract has been signed, we assume parties can renegotiate the terms of the
original contract. For simplicity we assume the agent makes a take it or leave it o¤er at
this stage. If the agreed contract is a menu of quantity and transfers, the agent chooses
the production level at 4 and payo¤s are realized at 5: the principal gets V (q) ¡ t (where
t is the payment the principal makes for the q units), and the agent gets either t ¡ C (q) or
t ¡ C (q) ¡ ￿ if he acquired the hard information.
A contract
Given a certain contract, the agent will choose to acquire information or not depending
on the expected payo¤s. To …nd the optimal contract the principal would o¤er, our approach
is to solve two di¤erent problems. First we assume the principal, independently of the cost
3This assumption can be relaxed. It is enough to assume that the principal’s cost of acquiring pre-
contractual information is at least as large as the agent’s cost (￿). See Section 5.
6￿, wants to induce the agent to acquire the information. We then solve the case where
the principal induces no information acquisition (for any ￿). By comparing the principal’s
expected pro…ts in both cases we determine which contract is optimal for each possible value
of ￿:
We assume that the principal can not observe if the agent acquires information or not,
unless the agent acquires the hard information and decides to share it with the principal.
In any case, a court is unable to verify neither the information nor the fact that the agent
acquired it.
To solve the problem when the principal induces no information acquisition we can
restrict attention to contracts specifying two pairs (t;q):4 That is, a feasible contract is
c0 = (t0;q0;t0;q0) 2 e C = <£<+ £<£<+: Without loss of generality, we restrict attention
to contracts satisfying:





0ﬂ ¸ t0 ¡ ﬂq0:
Let C ½ e C denote the subset of contracts satisfying the above conditions.5
Renegotiation
Renegotiation can take place in two di¤erent scenarios depending on whether the agent
spent ￿ or not. In the …rst case he would have hard information about his own costs while
in the second case his information is soft (cannot be credibly communicated).





4As will become clear in Section 4.2, when the principal induces information acquisition we can also
restrict attention to contracts that specify only two pairs (t;q):
5The …rst pair (t;q) is weakly preferred by the low cost type and the second one by the high cost type.
If that is not the case, the contract could be reinterpreted: if both types prefer the same pair (t;q) -i.e,









To avoid any ambiguity, attention is restricted to contracts that satisfy the usual incentive compatibility
constraints.
7o¤er the agent would make when the original contract is c0; he has hard information, and
his type is ﬂ and ﬂ respectively.













when his type is ﬂ and ﬂ respectively.
3. Two Extreme Cases, ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 0
In this section we illustrate the model by informally discussing the two extreme cases in
which the cost of acquiring information (￿) is in…nite and zero. The principal chooses an
initial contract c0 = (t0;q0;t0;q0) that will be later renegotiated.
Consider …rst the situation when ￿ = 1: In this case the agent simply can not acquire






















There is a continuum of contracts involving e¢cient quantities (q0 = q¤ and q0 = q¤), and
payments t0 and t0 such that the incentive compatibility constraints are satis…ed, and the
agent gets his reservation utility.6
It is straightforward to show that these contracts are renegotiation proof (they specify
e¢cient quantities). Since the agent gets no rent and the quantities speci…ed are e¢cient, it
is immediate to conclude that any of these contracts is a solution to the principal’s problem.
Figure C.1 illustrates the set of optimal contracts in this case.
Consider now the case of ￿ = 0 and let c0 =
¡
q¤ﬂ;q¤;q0ﬂ;q0¢
; where q0 satis…es V (q0)¡
q0ﬂ = V (q¤) ¡ q¤ﬂ (illustrated in Figure C.2). If the agent chooses not to acquire the
6There is a continuum of equilibria from (t~;t~) to (t^;t^) where (t~;t~) satis…es t~ ¡ q¤ﬂ = t~ ¡ q¤ﬂ and
(t^;t^) satis…es t^ ¡ q¤ﬂ = t^ ¡ q¤ﬂ and both pairs gives zero ex-ante rent to the agent.
8information, then he would get an expected negative payo¤ since cs;ﬂ (c0) = cs;ﬂ (c0) = c0
(see Section 4.1.2). He would therefore reject the o¤ered contract.
Instead, if he acquires the information and shares it at the renegotiation stage, his ex-
pected payo¤ becomes 0 since ch;ﬂ (c0) =
¡
q¤ﬂ;q¤¢




and Figure C.2). Note also that the low cost type has no incentives to pretend he did not
acquire information. By showing he is low type his payo¤ is determined by ch;ﬂ (c0); and he
gets q¤ﬂ ¡q¤ﬂ = 0; while by pretending he is uninformed his payo¤ would be determined by
cs;ﬂ (c0) and his payo¤ would also be zero (see Section 4.1.2)
Since the renegotiation of c0 involves e¢cient quantities and the agent gets no rent, then
it has to be that c0 is a solution to the principal’s problem.
Note that in both extreme cases the production level is always e¢cient and the principal
is able to appropriate all the ex-ante surplus of the relationship, leaving the agent with no
ex-ante rent. These results will not hold in general for intermediate values of ￿.
4. The General Case, ￿ 2 (0;1)
4.1. Inducing no information acquisition
In this subsection we assume the principal will choose the initial contract to maximize his
utility, but constrained to induce the agent not to acquire information. The principal is going
to choose a contract c0 = ft0;q0;q0;q0g that will be renegotiated to cs;ﬂ (c0) or cs;ﬂ (c0):7
We will solve principal’s maximization problem when she wants to induce the agent not
7To simplify notation, let (ts;qs;ts;qs) be the relevant renegotiated contract: when the equilibrium of the
renegotiation game is pooling, then
(ts;qs;ts;qs) =
¡
ts;ﬂ (c0);qs;ﬂ (c0);ts;ﬂ (c0);qs;ﬂ (c0)
¢










9to acquire information in three steps: …rst, we will assume that the original contract, when it
induces the agent not to acquire information, cannot be renegotiated (subsection 4.1.1); sec-
ond, we will solve the renegotiation problem when the agent is uninformed (subsection 4.1.2);
and …nally, we will show that the optimal contract found in the …rst step is renegotiation
proof.
4.1.1. The optimal allocation that induces the agent not to acquire information
To characterize the optimal allocation (for the principal) such that the agent does not acquire
information, we solve principal’s problem assuming that, if the agent does not acquire pre-
contractual information, there is no possibility of renegotiation. We will see that this optimal
contract is renegotiation proof (satis…es the conditions of Corollary 1) and, therefore, it is
the solution to principal’s problem when inducing no pre-contractual information gathering.
The principal chooses c0 = ft0;q0;t0;q0g to solve
max
c0
…(V (q0) ¡ t0) + (1 ¡ …)(V (q
0) ¡ t
0) (PU)
subject to the usual incentive compatibility and participation constraints





0ﬂ ¸ t0 ¡ q0ﬂ (IC2)
…(t0 ¡ q0ﬂ) + (1 ¡ …)(t
0 ¡ q
0ﬂ) ¸ 0; (IR)
and an incentive compatibility constraint between acquiring vs. not acquiring information
(ICU). To derive this constraint notice that if the contract is renegotiated after the agent
acquired hard information an e¢cient outcome will be achieved (see Subsection 4.2.1). Since
the agent is assumed to have all the bargaining power at the renegotiation stage, his payo¤
when he acquires pre-contractual information is going to be
maxfV (q
¤) ¡ q
¤ﬂ ¡ [V (q0) ¡ t0];0g if ﬂ = ﬂ; and
maxfV (q
¤) ¡ q
¤ﬂ ¡ [V (q
0) ¡ t
0];0g if ﬂ = ﬂ:
10It is trivial to show that (IC1), (IC2) and (IR) imply V (q¤) ¡ q¤ﬂ ¡ [V (q0) ¡ t0] ¸ 0;
therefore, the constraint to prevent information acquisition can be written as:
…(t0 ¡ q0ﬂ) + (1 ¡ …)(t
0 ¡ q
0ﬂ) ¸ …[V (q
¤) ¡ q
¤ﬂ ¡ (V (q0) ¡ t0)]+
(1 ¡ …)maxfV (q
¤) ¡ q
¤ﬂ ¡ (V (q
0) ¡ t
0);0g ¡ ￿: (ICU)
Which can be rewritten as:
￿ ¸ …[V (q
¤) ¡ V (q0) ¡ ﬂ(q
¤ ¡ q0)] + (1 ¡ …)[V (q




￿ ¸ …[V (q
¤) ¡ V (q0) ¡ ﬂ(q
¤ ¡ q0)] ¡ (1 ¡ …)(t
0 ¡ q
0ﬂ): (ICU2)
Before presenting the solution to this problem (Propositions (1) and (2)) it is useful to












q : q < q




; where e ﬂ = (1 ¡ …)ﬂ + …ﬂ;
￿B ´ (1 ¡ …)[V (q




￿A ´ (1 ¡ …)…q
0(ﬂ ¡ ﬂ);
￿L ´ (1 ¡ …)…q
¤(ﬂ ¡ ﬂ);
￿C ´ e q
0(ﬂ ¡ ﬂ)…(1 ¡ …):
Proposition 1. If q0 > e q0 (Case 1),8 the solution to (PU) is characterized by:
t0 = q
¤ﬂ + q















> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
q¤ if ￿L · ￿
￿
(1¡…)…(ﬂ¡ﬂ) if ￿A < ￿ < ￿L
q0 if ￿B · ￿ · ￿A
fq : q < q¤ ^ V (q) ¡ qﬂ = V (q¤) ¡ q¤ﬂ ¡
￿
1¡…g if ￿ < ￿B;
8Note that q0 > e q0 is equivalent to assume ￿A < ￿B.
11Proof: see appendix A.
Proposition 2. If q0 · e q0 (Case 2), the solution to (PU) is characterized by:
t0 = q
¤ﬂ + q















> > > <
> > > :
q¤ if ￿L · ￿
￿
(1¡…)…(ﬂ¡ﬂ) if ￿C < ￿ < ￿L
fq : q < q¤ ^ V (q) ¡ qﬂ = V (q¤) ¡ q¤ﬂ ¡
￿
1¡…g if ￿ · ￿C
Proof: see appendix A. Figures C.3 and C.4 summarize the results for q0:9
4.1.2. The renegotiation stage when the agent cannot credibly show his type
The initial contract c0 2 C the principal o¤ers de…nes a renegotiation game G(c0) where the
agent sends a message (renegotiation o¤er) cs = fts;qs;ts;qsg 2 C, then the principal either
accepts or rejects the o¤er, and …nally the agent decides the quantity to produce and payo¤s
are realized according to c0 if the principal rejected the o¤er and to cs if she accepted:
As usual in signalling games, many outcomes can be supported in equilibrium if no
restrictions are imposed on beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path. In this case, by imposing the
Intuitive Criterion proposed by Cho and Kreps (1987), it turns out that there is a unique
outcome that can be supported in equilibrium.
Proposition 3. For any initial contract c0 2 C that satis…es V (q0) ¡ t0 ¸ V (q0) ¡ t0;10
the unique Intuitive Criterion equilibrium outcome of G(c0) satis…es: the low cost type ﬂ
produces the e¢cient quantity q¤ and receives a transfer ts ´ t0+V
¡
q¤¢
¡V (q0); and the high
9To draw Figures C.3, C.4, C.6, C.7, C.10, and C.11 we assumed that V (q) = 100
p
q; ﬂ = 50; ﬂ = 25: …
is 0:3 in Case 1 and 0:7 in Case 2.
10Restricting attention to contracts c0 2 C and satisfy V (q0)¡t0 ¸ V
¡
q0¢
¡t0 is with no loss of generality
(note that the contracts proposed in Propositions 1 and 2 satisfy these restrictions).
12cost type ﬂ receives ts (c0) ´ t0+V (qs (c0))¡V (q0) and produces qs (c0) = minfq¤;q¤(c0)g;
where q¤(c0) ´
©




= V (q) ¡ [V (q0) ¡ t0]
ª
:11
Proof: see Appendix A. Figure C.5 illustrates the de…nitions of t¤(c0); t¤¤(c0); and
q¤¤(c0) when q¤ > q¤(c0).
Corollary 1. If the initial contract c0 = ft0;q0;t0;q0g 2 C satis…es V (q0)¡t0 ¸ V (q0)¡t0;
q0 = q¤; q0 · q¤; and t0 = t0 ¡ ﬂ
¡
q¤ ¡ q0¢
; then the unique equilibrium outcome satisfying
the intuitive criterion of the renegotiation game G(c0) is (ts;qs) = (t0;q0) if ﬂ = ﬂ and
(ts;qs) = (t0;q0) if ﬂ = ﬂ: The initial contract c0 is renegotiation proof.




then q¤(c0) has to satisfy V (q¤(c0)) = V (q0): Then, by de…nition, ts = t0:¥
Combining Propositions 1 and 2, the optimal for the principal when she wants to deter
information acquisition is characterized by:12
t0 = q
¤ﬂ + q















> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
q¤; if ￿L < ￿
￿
(ﬂ¡ﬂ)…(1¡…); if maxf￿A;￿Cg · ￿ · ￿L
q0 = q0; if ￿B · ￿ · ￿A
fq : q < q¤ ^ V (q) ¡ ﬂq = V (q¤) ¡ q¤ﬂ ¡
￿
1¡…g; if ￿ · minf￿B;￿Cg:
Remark 1. The above contract (t0;q0;t0;q0) satis…es the conditions of Corollary 1 and,
therefore, is renegotiation proof.
Then, the above equations characterize the solution to Principal’s problem when he wants
the agent not to acquire information.
11Figure C.5 illustrates the de…nitions of t¤ (c0); t¤¤ (c0); and q¤¤ (c0) when q¤ > q¤ (c0).
12Note that ￿C > ￿A , ￿C < ￿B:
13As intuition suggests, for large values of ￿ the principal …nds optimal to induce e¢cient
levels of production and is able to extract all the surplus of the relationship (the problem is
identical to one with an uninformed agent).
For values of ￿ between ￿L and ￿A (￿C in Case 2) the principal …nds optimal to prevent
the information acquisition by distorting the quantity the bad type produces, this gives the
agent zero ex-ante rent.
For smaller values of ￿ (between ￿A and ￿B in Case 1) it is too costly for the principal to
keep reducing the quantity the high cost type is supposed to produce. The agent then gets
some rent.
For even lower values of ￿ (smaller than ￿B.or ￿C), if the principal were to continue
reducing q0 in Case 2 or maintaining q0 in Case 1, the agent would …nd that q0 is too small
and he would choose to acquire information and then renegotiate. To prevent this, the
principal needs to increase q0: In the limit, when ￿ = 0, the agent would always spend ￿ and
renegotiate if q0 < q¤; therefore the principal has to choose q0 = q¤:
As expected, principal’s pro…t when he induces the agent not to acquire information is
increasing in ￿: The larger is the cost of obtaining information, the easier it is to deter its
acquisition. Figures C.6 and C.7 illustrate her expected pro…ts as a function of ￿:
4.2. Inducing information acquisition
4.2.1. The renegotiation stage when the agent can credibly show his type
When the agent spends ￿ to acquire the information and he accepts the contract, he has the
opportunity to credibly communicate his type to the principal. Therefore, the renegotiation
o¤er does not have to satisfy the usual incentive compatibility constraints.














s. to V (q
h) ¡ t
h ¸ V (q
0) ¡ t
0:
14It is immediate to show that the solution to these problems are












0 + V (q




Figure C.8 illustrates the results for an initial contract c0 = ft0;q0;t0;q0g: 13
4.2.2. The optimal contract
Note that principal’s pro…t when she induces information acquisition can be at most
…[V (q
¤) ¡ q
¤ﬂ] + (1 ¡ …)[V (q
¤) ¡ q
¤ﬂ] ¡ ￿;
otherwise the agent’s incentive rationality constraint
…fV (q
¤) ¡ q
¤ﬂ ¡ [V (q0) ¡ t0]g + (1 ¡ …)fV (q
¤) ¡ q
¤ﬂ ¡ [V (q
0) ¡ t
0]g ¸ ￿ (IR)
would be violated.
On the other hand, for the agent to acquire the information, it has to be that his expected
payo¤ from acquiring information is at least what he would get if he does not acquire the
information and accepts the contract. That is,
…fV (q
¤) ¡ q
¤ﬂ ¡ [V (q0) ¡ t0]g + (1 ¡ …)fV (q
¤) ¡ q
¤ﬂ ¡ [V (q
0) ¡ t
0]g ¡ ￿ ¸
…(ts(c0) ¡ ﬂqs(c0)) + (1 ¡ …)(t
s(c0) ¡ ﬂq
s(c0)) (ICI)
has to be satis…ed.
13Note that neither an agent type ﬂ nor a type ﬂ can do better by pretending to be uninformed:
th ¡ qhﬂ = V (q¤) ¡ q¤ﬂ ¡ V (q0) + t0 ¸ t0 + V
¡
q¤¢
¡ V (q0) ¡ q¤ﬂ = ts ¡ qsﬂ
and
th ¡ qhﬂ = V (q¤) ¡ ﬂq¤ ¡ V (q0) ¡ t0 ¸ t0 + V (q¤¤ (c0)) ¡ V
¡
q0¢
¡ ﬂq¤¤ (c0) = ts ¡ qsﬂ
, V (q¤) ¡ ﬂq¤ ¸ V (q¤¤ (c0)) ¡ ﬂq¤¤ (c0)
since q¤ is the e¢cient quantity when ﬂ = ﬂ.




¤ﬂ ¡ [V (q0) ¡ t0] ¸ 0 (IRﬂ)
V (q
¤) ¡ q
¤ﬂ ¡ [V (q
0) ¡ t
0] ¸ 0 (IRﬂ)
should be satis…ed.14
Proposition 4 below shows that there is a contract c0 such that the principal extracts
all the surplus (minus ￿), and the above constraints (IR, ICI, IRﬂ and IRﬂ), plus the
usual incentive compatibility ones, are satis…ed. Such a contract is therefore optimal for the
principal given that she wants to induce information acquisition.








0 = fq : V (q
¤) ¡ V (q) + ﬂq ¡ q
¤ﬂ = ￿=(1 ¡ …)g
satis…es (IR); (ICI); (IRﬂ); (IRﬂ); (IC1); and (IC2) and principal’s payo¤ is
…[V (q
¤) ¡ q
¤ﬂ] + (1 ¡ …)[V (q
¤) ¡ q
¤ﬂ] ¡ ￿:
Proof: see appendix A.
Figure C.9 illustrates the optimal contracts o¤ered for the two extreme cases when ￿ is
zero and when it is equal to (1 ¡ …)[V (q¤) ¡ q¤ﬂ].
14The above constraints are the relevant ones since for both types of agent it is optimal, given a contract
c0; to share the acquired information. See footnote 13.
15It is enough for us to characterize the solution to this problem for values of ￿ · (1 ¡ …)[V (q¤) ¡ ﬂq¤]:
Proposition 5 in the next section shows that for values of ￿ larger than (1 ¡ …)[V (q¤) ¡ ﬂq¤] the principal
will always prefer to induce the agent not to get information.
164.3. Results
In the next Proposition we put the results of previous sections together to …nd the critical
value of the cost of acquiring information (￿) that determines whether the principal is going






f(1 ¡ …)[V (q
¤) ¡ q




Case 1 - q0 > e q0: If ￿ · ￿¤ then the optimal contract is the one characterized in Proposition
4; and if ￿ > ￿¤; then it is the one characterized by Proposition 1.
Case 2 - q0 · e q0: If ￿ · ￿C = e q0(ﬂ ¡ ﬂ)…(1 ¡ …); then the optimal contract is the one
characterized in Proposition 4; if ￿ > ￿C; then it is the one characterized by Proposition 2.
Proof: see appendix A. Figures C.10 and C.11 illustrates the results for both cases.
The principal appropriates all the surplus minus ￿ when the agent acquires information.
Note also that the production is distorted away from the optimal level only when the agent
does not acquire information and he is bad type.
It is easy to check that in Case 2 agent’s expected payo¤ is zero for any value of the cost
of acquiring of information (￿). On the other hand, in Case 1 agent’s expected payo¤ is
positive and decreasing in ￿ in the interval (￿¤;￿A) : when ￿ 2 [￿A;￿L) it is optimal for the
principal to induce no pre-contractual information gathering by distorting the quantity the
high cost type will produce and giving the agent zero ex-ante rent. When ￿ < ￿A it is too
costly for the principal to deter information acquisition by further decreasing the quantity
the high cost type is going to produce, and she …nds optimal to increase the transfer to
the high cost type (as ￿ decreases) while maintaining the quantity he produces (q0). This
will continue up to the point ￿¤, where the principal …nds that is better for her to induce
the agent to acquire pre-contractual information, inducing (after the renegotiation) e¢cient
production levels and giving no ex-ante rent to the agent.
175. Robustness of the Model
The robustness of the model to certain assumptions is discussed in this section. Several
assumptions were made to simplify the analysis, but can be somewhat relaxed.
* First of all, we have assumed that the principal can not learn the agent’s type at any
cost. This is a maintained assumption in the papers discussed in the Introduction. It may
be natural for many problems, but certainly not for those in which the uncertainty is related
to the project itself rather than to the agent (i.e., the example of cleaning a land mentioned
in the Introduction). For our results to hold (in terms of payo¤s and production levels as a
function of (￿), it is enough to assume that the principal can learn the type, either before or
after o¤ering the contract, at a cost (–) greater than or equal to the agent’s cost (￿).
The proof is trivial: simply note that principal’s expected payo¤ is greater than or equal
to the total expected surplus minus the cost ￿; for any value of ￿: Therefore, the principal
would never be better o¤ spending – ¸ ￿.
* We also assumed that both the pre-contractual information and the fact of acquiring
it were observable but non-veri…able. If we maintain the assumption that the acquisition
of information is non-veri…able, we could assume that the acquired information, should the
agent disclose it, is veri…able. In this case the results of the paper in terms of payo¤s and
production levels would still hold.
For values of ￿ below the critical value (￿¤ or ￿C), the contract o¤ered would involve
e¢cient production levels and the principal getting the total surplus of the relationship minus
the cost ￿.
In those cases where the principal induces the agent not to get information (￿ above the
critical value), the only di¤erence that this assumption could make is by easing the constraint
4.1, but this constraint is never binding when ￿ is above the critical value.
Moreover, if we maintain the assumption that the contract can be renegotiated, the
constraint 4.1 would not change at all: the constraint 4.1 could be eased only if the principal
is able to threat the agent about bringing veri…able information. However, if there is no
commitment not to renegotiate, after accepting the contract the agent could approach the
18principal and make a renegotiation o¤er contingent on showing the appropriate information.
* An assumption of the paper is that the principal and the agent cannot commit to avoid
renegotiation. If they were able to commit and we restrict attention to contracts of the form
c0 = ft0;q0;t0;q0g, the results would certainly be di¤erent. In this case, the only purpose for
the agent of spending ￿ would be to eventually reject those contracts that give him a negative
payo¤.16 However, if we do not allow for renegotiation and we maintain the assumption of
the pre-contractual information being hard, there is no justi…cation to restrict attention to
contracts like c0 = ft0;q0;t0;q0g.
More complex contracts (like message contingent contracts) can induce e¢cient outcomes.
In the context of this paper, the principal may use this contracts to induce the agent to
acquire hard information and produce the e¢cient quantities (see Appendix B for an example
of such a contract).
When would the principal use this message contingent contracts? Since production would
be e¢cient (and the agent will be left with no ex-ante rent), principal’s payo¤ would be the
total expected surplus minus the cost of acquiring the pre-contractual information. Exactly
what she was able to get when renegotiation was allowed and she induced the agent to acquire
information. On the other hand, if the principal wants to induce the agent not to acquire
information, his problem is the one we solved in Section 4.1.1. Therefore, the principal would
use a message contingent contract only if the cost of acquiring the information is below the
critical value we found in Section 4.3 (￿¤ in Case 1 or ￿C in Case 2).
* We assumed that when the agent does not acquire pre-contractual information and
accepts the contract, he learns his type at no cost but he can not generate hard information
at this stage. (On the example mentioned in the Introduction, to delay the cleaning process
once started to generate hard information would be prohibitively costly). If we want to
assume that at this stage the agent can still generate hard information at a cost ￿0; our
results would hold as long as ￿0 ¸ ￿=(1 ¡ …) holds.
* Finally, we assumed that the agent makes the renegotiation o¤er after accepting the
16In such a case the solution will coincide with the one in Cremer and Khalil (1992).
19contract. In the case that he does not get pre-contractual information this is a natural
assumption to do, since he learns his type only after accepting the contract.
However, when he does get pre-contractual information he could, in principle, make a
renegotiation o¤er before accepting the contract. The underlying assumption in the model
is that the principal has the bargaining power before the contract is signed and the agent
has it once he has accepted the contract. In this situation, the agent would never choose to
reveal the information before accepting the contract.17
How do we justify this assumption that the bargaining power switches from the principal
to the agent? First of all, note that the principal is always willing to give the agent all the
bargaining power at the renegotiation stage: the optimal contract that induces no informa-
tion acquisition (derived in Section 4.1.1) coincides with the one the principal would o¤er if
there were no possibility of renegotiation (that is, renegotiation does not hurt the principal
when inducing no pre-contractual information acquisition); and when the principal induces
the agent to get pre-contractual information and the agent has all the bargaining power,
principal’s pro…t is the maximum possible (total surplus minus ￿).
Therefore, it would be enough to …nd a way in which the principal can commit to give
the agent the bargaining power. Following Aghion, Dewatripont & Rey (1994), we could
have assumed that the renegotiation game is an in…nite-bargaining process with alternating
o¤ers (the agent makes the …rst one) where each party can enforce the initial contract at
any period after receiving the o¤er from the other party, and the principal has to pay a large
enough …ne to the agent if there is no agreement after two rounds of bargaining.
Under these assumptions, if the agent acquired pre-contractual information and he shows
this information to the principal, the unique outcome of the bargaining game is ex-post
e¢cient and gives the principal her reservation utility (given the initial contract). This
outcome is exactly the same we obtained by assuming the agent has all the bargaining
power at the renegotiation stage.
17The principal could reject his countero¤er and then make him a new o¤er for the e¢cient quantity and
the exact cost of it ((q¤ﬂ;q¤) if ﬂ = ﬂ and (q¤ﬂ;q¤) if ﬂ = ﬂ ), giving the agent a payo¤ of ¡￿:
20Since these kind of mechanisms are not observed very often in reality, it would be worth
exploring how are our results a¤ected when we consider more general renegotiation games.
6. Final Discussion
Previous agency models with pre-contractual information gathering focus on two dimensions
of the problem: the information acquisition being only strategic or productive and the tim-
ing of the information acquisition. Here, we assume the agent gathers the pre-contractual
information after receiving the o¤er from the principal and, if he decides not to gather it,
he learns his type before deciding the production level (so the information acquisition is for
strategic purposes only).
We take into account new dimensions of the problem by assuming the costly acquired
information to be hard (but not veri…able) and by allowing for renegotiation. We consider this
a plausible case in many situations where the agent can generate evidence (i.e., contracting
a consultant …rm) about his type that may convince the principal but can not convince a
court (the information is observable but not veri…able).
We …nd that when the cost of acquiring the pre-contractual information (￿) is below a
critical level, the agent will acquire it, he will (credibly) communicate it to the principal, and
there will be renegotiation. The principal is in this case able to extract all the surplus of the
relationship minus the cost ￿ by choosing the appropriate status quo point with the original
contract. Obviously the principal’s payo¤ function is decreasing in ￿ for values below the
critical one.
When ￿ is above the critical value the optimal contract induces no pre-contractual infor-
mation acquisition and the contract o¤ered by the principal is renegotiation proof. Principal’s
expected pro…ts increase as a function of ￿ in this case and, for large enough values of ￿
(greater than ￿L), the principal extracts all the expected surplus of the relationship.
The non-monotonicity of the principal’s payo¤ function implies that the principal would
not necessarily bene…t from an increase in the agent’s cost of acquiring pre-contractual
information or from facing more than one potential agent in competition for the job (as she
21does when the acquired information is soft and there is no renegotiation). She would bene…t
for sure if ￿ is above its critical value (that is when the optimal contract with one agent
induces no information acquisition), and this is so because when there is competition the
potential bene…t for an agent of acquiring information is smaller. Therefore the incentive
compatibility constraint to deter information acquisition would be eased and principal’s
bene…t would be larger.18
When e q0 < q0 (Case 1) and ￿ 2 (￿¤;￿A) agent’s expected payo¤ is positive and decreasing
in ￿ and it is zero if ￿ is smaller than ￿¤. These non-monotonicities in the payo¤ functions are
in contrast with the results obtained in Crémer and Khalil (1992) (where agent’s expected
payo¤ is decreasing in the cost of acquiring information and principal’s is increasing), and
their explanation is directly related to the observability of the information gathered and the
possibility of renegotiation.
As mentioned before, the situations that …t the environment of this paper include those
where the agent is able to convince the principal with non-veri…able information. When
￿ is below the critical value, there will always be a renegotiation of the initial contract.
For these cases, the model provides one (of many) plausible explanation for cost overruns
in procurement problems (i.e., defense contracts): principal and agent sign a contract (that
they know they will renegotiate) whose main purpose is to set conditions for the renegotiation
18This point is made in Crémer and Khalil (1992), where the principal’s payo¤ is a non-decreasing function
of ￿. The optimal contract when there are many agents is not derived in Crémer and Khalil (1992), but
they prove that the principal can design a mechanism inducing no information acquisition in which he does
better than when there is only one agent.
In our framework, if there are several agents and the principal decides to deal with only one of them, the
principal would do as well as in the case with only one agent. But, if the principal is forced by law to o¤er to
all the potential agents the same contract, then he could be worse-o¤ (for some values of ￿ below the critical
one).
22and induce the agent to acquire pre-contractual information.19;20
The situation addressed in this paper is one of many one could imagine in the context of
principal-agent relationships with pre-contractual information acquisition. While maintain-
ing the assumption of hard information, we could consider cases where the agent does not
learn his type until the end of the game unless he spends ￿ and/or he gets the information
before receiving the o¤er from the principal. Other extensions could consider cases with more
than one agent and/or cases where the uncertainty is also about the principal’s valuation of
the object.
19Even though the countero¤er by the agent is made after accepting the contract, it is essential in the
model that the agent is able to acquire the information before accepting the o¤er. Otherwise, the principal
would solve the problem by o¤ering an incentive compatible contract that induces e¢cient production levels
for every states (and therefore will not be renegotiated) and gives the agent no ex-ante rent.
20Another possible explanation for cost overruns makes use of incomplete contracts: ex-ante, the quality
of the good can not be described, therefore a contract for a good with standard characteristics (and low
price) is written down. As production takes place the agent learns he can provide a higher quality (and can
e¤ectively communicate this to the principal), then the contract is renegotiated (Tirole, 1986).
23A. Appendix: Proofs Missing from the Text
A.1. Preliminaries for the Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2
Assuming IC2 is satis…ed (it can be veri…ed afterwards), it is immediate from the …rst order
conditions that q0 = q¤: Principal’s problem can then be written as
Max
t0;t0;q0…(V (q
¤) ¡ t0) + (1 ¡ …)(V (q
0) ¡ t
0) + „f…(t0 ¡ q
¤ﬂ) + (1 ¡ …)(t
0 ¡ q
0ﬂ)g
+ ‚f¡(1 ¡ …)[V (q




+ `f(1 ¡ …)(t
0 ¡ q





The …rst order conditions of (P0
U) are:
¡(1 ¡ …) + „(1 ¡ …) ¡ ˆ + `(1 ¡ …) = 0 (A.1)
¡(1 ¡ …) + „(1 ¡ …) ¡ ˆ + `(1 ¡ …) = 0 (A.2)
(1 ¡ …)V
0(q
0) + ‚(1 ¡ …)(V
0(q
0) ¡ ﬂ) ¡ „(1 ¡ …)ﬂ + ˆﬂ ¡ `(1 ¡ …)ﬂ = 0 (A.3)
…(t0 ¡ q
¤ﬂ) + (1 ¡ …)(t
0 ¡ q




0ﬂ ¸ 0; = 0 if ˆ > 0; ˆ ¸ 0 (A.5)
¡(1 ¡ …)[V (q
¤) ¡ V (q
0) ¡ ﬂ(q
¤ ¡ q
0)] + ￿ ¸ 0; = 0 if ‚ > 0; ‚ ¸ 0 (A.6)
(1 ¡ …)(t
0 ¡ q
0ﬂ) + ￿ ¸ 0; = 0 if ` > 0; ` ¸ 0 (A.7)
Lemma A1, Corollary 2 and Lemma A2 are preliminary results used in the proofs of
Propositions 1 and 2
Lemma A1. If ￿ < ￿L then ˆ > 0 and ` > 0:
Proof of Lemma A1.
* Suppose ˆ = 0; then (A.1) implies „ = 1 and (A.2) implies ` = 0: Then, equation (A.3)
and condition (A.4) simplify to:
(1 ¡ …)(V
0(q










24(A.8), (A.9) and (A.5) imply then:
t
0 · q
¤[(1 ¡ …)ﬂ + …ﬂ] (A.10)
Then condition (A.7) and (A.10) give the desired contradiction:
￿ ¸ (1 ¡ …)q
¤ﬂ ¡ (1 ¡ …)q
¤[(1 ¡ …)ﬂ + …ﬂ]
￿ = q
¤…(1 ¡ …)(ﬂ ¡ ﬂ) = ￿L ) ˆ > 0:
* From (A.1) ˆ = …(1 ¡ „); then it must be that „ < 1: Then, combining (A.1) and (A.2)
we get ` =
1¡„
1¡… > 0:
Corollary 2. If ￿ < ￿L then t0 = q¤ﬂ + q0(ﬂ ¡ ﬂ) ¡
￿
1¡… and t0 = q0ﬂ ¡
￿
1¡…
Proof of Corollary 2. Immediate from conditions (A.5), (A.7) and Lemma A1.
Lemma A2. For any ￿; the solution to (P
0
U) satis…es maxfq0; e q0g · q0 · q¤:
Proof of Lemma A2.
* From equations (A.1) and (A.2) we obtain ˆ = (1 ¡ „)… (then „ · 1) and ` =
1¡„
1¡….




ﬂ[1 + ‚(1 ¡ …)] ¡ …ﬂ ¡ „…(ﬂ ¡ ﬂ)






ﬂ[1 + ‚(1 ¡ …)] ¡ …ﬂ
(1 ¡ …)(1 + ‚)
´ F(‚);
where the …rst inequality follows from „ · 1 and the second from „ ¸ 0.





(1 ¡ …)(1 + ‚)
¡
ﬂ[1 + ‚(1 ¡ …)] ¡ …ﬂ
(1 ¡ …)(1 + ‚)2 =
…(ﬂ ¡ ﬂ) ¡ ﬂ(…‚ + 1)





ﬂ[1 + ‚(1 ¡ …)] ¡ …ﬂ
(1 ¡ …)(1 + ‚)











* Suppose ￿ ¸ ￿C: Using Corollary 2 condition (A.4) can be written as
…q









0 ¸ e q
0:
* Suppose ￿ < ￿C: Condition (A.6) implies
V (q








adding ¡V (e q0) + e q0ﬂ on both sides and rearranging terms
V (q
¤) ¡ q
¤ﬂ ¡ V (e q
0) + e q
0ﬂ ¡ …e q
0(ﬂ ¡ ﬂ) ¡ V (q
0) + q
0ﬂ < ¡V (e q
0) + e q
0ﬂ;
and using the de…nition of e q0
¡V (q
0) + q
0ﬂ < ¡V (e q
0) + e q
0ﬂ ) q
0 > e q
0:
Proof of Proposition 1.
1) (￿ ¸ ￿L):
* Principal’s expected pro…ts are equal to the total expected surplus:
…(V (q
























¤ﬂ) + (1 ¡ …)(V (q
¤) ¡ q
¤ﬂ):
* And all the constraints are satis…ed:
26- with the expressions for t0 and t0 (IC’) and (IR’) are satis…ed for any values of q0,
- (IC
0
UI1) reduces to ￿ ¸ 0; and
- (IC
0
UI2) simpli…es to ￿ ¸ ￿L.
2) (￿A · ￿ < ￿L):
* By Lemma A1 we know ˆ;` > 0:














= V (e q







= V (e q
0) ¡ e q
0ﬂ + …e q
0(ﬂ ¡ ﬂ)
where the second and third equalities follow from the de…nition of e q0 and e ﬂ respectively.






· V (e q
0) ¡ e q
0ﬂ + …e q
0(ﬂ ¡ ﬂ);




0(ﬂ ¡ ﬂ) · V (e q
0) ¡ e q
0ﬂ + …e q
0(ﬂ ¡ ﬂ):
Since q0 > e q0 this inequality implies q0 < e q0 < q0 which contradicts Lemma A2. Therefore
it has to be that ‚ = 0:










Using Corollary (2) and the above result, condition (A.4) can be rewritten as
…(q
0(ﬂ ¡ ﬂ) ¡
￿
1 ¡ …




, ￿ · …q
0(ﬂ ¡ ﬂ)(1 ¡ …) = ￿A;
which contradicts the assumption that ￿A < ￿ < ￿L. Therefore „ > 0:
* Since „ > 0; then …(t0¡q¤ﬂ)+(1¡…)(t0¡q0ﬂ) = 0: Substituting t0 and t0 with the result




(1 ¡ …)…(ﬂ ¡ ﬂ)
:
3) (￿ = ￿A):
* Following the …rst two steps of the previous case (￿A · ￿ < ￿L) we conclude ˆ;` > 0 and
‚ = 0:










* Assume „ > 0: Then …(t0 ¡ q¤ﬂ) + (1 ¡ …)(t0 ¡ q0ﬂ) = 0: Substituting t0 and t0 (recall




(1 ¡ …)…(ﬂ ¡ ﬂ)
;
and, by de…nition of ￿A; q0 = q0:
4) (￿B < ￿ < ￿A):
* Assume ‚ > 0; condition (A.6) can be written as:
V (q
0) ¡ q













where the last equality follows from the de…nition of ￿B: Condition
V (q
0) ¡ q
0ﬂ < V (q
0) ¡ q
0ﬂ
implies q0 < q0; which contradicts Lemma A2. Therefore ‚ = 0:




(1 ¡ …)…(ﬂ ¡ ﬂ)
< q
0 for ￿ < ￿A;
which contradicts Lemma A2. Therefore „ = 0:
* If „ = ‚ = 0 equation (A.3) implies
(1 ¡ …)V
0(q









285) (￿ < ￿B):




(1 ¡ …)…(ﬂ ¡ ﬂ)
< q
0 if ￿ < ￿A;
which contradicts Lemma A2. Therefore „ = 0:
* If ‚ = „ = 0, then equation (A.3) implies q0 = q0; and condition (A.6) implies
￿ ¸ [V (q
¤) ¡ q
¤ﬂ ¡ V (q
0) + q
0ﬂ](1 ¡ …) = ￿B;
therefore ‚ > 0:
*Now ‚ > 0 implies [using condition (A.6)] that q0 satis…es
V (q
0) ¡ q






6) (￿ = ￿B):
* The same argument used in Step 4 implies „ = 0:
* If ‚ = „ = 0 then equation (3) implies:
(1 ¡ …)V
0(q









If ‚ > 0; then condition (A.6) implies that q0 satis…es:
V (q
0) ¡ q







0ﬂ = V (q
0) ¡ q
0ﬂ;
therefore q0 = q0:
Proof of Proposition 2.
1) (￿ ¸ ￿L): Idem Step 1 Proposition 1.
2) (￿C < ￿ < ￿L):
* Condition (A.4) together with Corollary 2 imply:
…q




0(ﬂ ¡ ﬂ) ) q
0 > e q
0;
29where the strict inequality follows from replacing ￿ by ￿C:
* Suppose ‚ > 0: Condition (A.6) and ￿ > ￿C imply
V (q
¤) ¡ q







adding ¡V (e q0) + e q0ﬂ ¡ …e q0(ﬂ ¡ ﬂ) on both sides gives
V (q
¤) ¡ q
¤ﬂ ¡ V (e q
0) + e q
0ﬂ ¡ …e q
0(ﬂ ¡ ﬂ) ¡ V (q
0) + q
0ﬂ > ¡V (e q
0) + e q
0ﬂ:
Then the de…nition of e q0 implies:
¡V (q
0) + q
0ﬂ > ¡V (e q
0) + e q
0ﬂ ) q
0 < e q
0;
contradicting condition (A.4). Therefore ‚ = 0:
* Suppose „ = ‚ = 0: Equation (A.3) implies q0 = q0 · e q0; but condition (A.4) requires
q0 > e q0; therefore „ > 0:




(1 ¡ …)…(ﬂ ¡ ﬂ)
:
3) (￿ < ￿C):
* Note that the last part of the proof of Lemma A2 implies q0 > e q0 when ￿ < ￿C:




(1 ¡ …)…(ﬂ ¡ ﬂ)
<
￿C
(1 ¡ …)…(ﬂ ¡ ﬂ)
= e q
0;
therefore „ = 0:








0 · e q
0;
therefore ‚ > 0:
* ‚ > 0 and Lemma A2 imply
q
0 = fq : q < q






304) (￿ = ￿C):
* Note that q0 = e q0 satis…es V (q0) ¡ q0ﬂ = V (q¤) ¡ q¤ﬂ ¡
￿C
1¡…:
* If ‚ = „ = 0, then equation (A.3) implies q0 = q0:
- If q0 = e q0 we have the desired result.
- If q0 < e q0; then q0 = q0 contradicts Lemma A2, therefore either ‚ or „ (or both) are greater
than zero.
* If ‚ > 0; condition (A.6) implies:
V (q
¤) ¡ q







using the de…nition of e q0 (and a similar argument to the second part of Step 2) we have
q0 = e q0:




(1 ¡ …)…(ﬂ ¡ ﬂ)
= e q
0:
Proof of Proposition 3. Drop the argument (c0) in the functions ts(c0); ts(c0), q¤(c0)
and qs(c0) to simplify notation and let the equilibrium outcome be (ts;qs) when ﬂ = ﬂ and
(ts;qs) when ﬂ = ﬂ:21







,22 therefore the low cost type can guarantee for himself a
utility equal to t0 + V
¡
q¤¢




V (q0) ¡ q¤ﬂ must hold.
* Suppose now that ts ¡ qsﬂ > t0 + V
¡
q¤¢
¡ V (q0) ¡ q¤ﬂ: For the principal to accept the
renegotiation, it must be that V (qs)¡ts > V (q0)¡t0 (otherwise ‚[V (qs)¡ts]+(1¡‚)[V (qs)¡
ts] < ‚[V (q0)¡t0]+(1¡‚)[V (q0)¡t0] for any beliefs ‚ 2 (0;1) the principal may have, and
21The analysis that follows is valid both for a pooling equilibrium -both types send the message
(ts;qs;ts;qs)- and for a separating one where type ﬂ sends (ts;qs;¢;¢) and type ﬂ sends (¢;¢;ts;qs):




31therefore she would reject the o¤er). But then the high cost type would have a pro…table
deviation (point Z in Figure C.12).
Formally, assume V (qs) ¡ ts > V (q0) ¡ t0 and (ts;qs) is the equilibrium outcome when
ﬂ = ﬂ: Let:
q
0 ´ fq : t
s ¡ ﬂ(q




0 = V (q






Consider the deviation for type ﬂ
¡
b t; b q
¢
= (t0 ¡ ·;q0); 23 where · = (ﬂ ¡ ﬂ)
qs¡q0
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¢ qs ¡ q0
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- Note that type ﬂ strictly prefers (ts;qs) to
¡
b t; b q
¢
:

















0 = b t ¡ ﬂb q
and then the incentive compatibility constraint implies
ts ¡ ﬂqs ¸ t
s ¡ ﬂq
s > b t ¡ ﬂb q:
- Since
¡
b t; b q
¢
is strictly preferred to the proposed equilibrium outcome by type ﬂ and the
equilibrium outcome (ts;qs) is strictly preferred to
¡
b t; b q
¢
by the low cost type (b t ¡ ﬂb q <
ts¡ﬂqs), then the Intuitive Criterion tells that if the principal receives the message
¡
b t; b q;b t;b q
¢
she has to believe that the message was sent by a type ﬂ with probability one.
- Finally, note that:
V (b q) ¡b t = V (q
0) ¡ t
0 + · = V (q
s) ¡ t
s + · = V (q
0) ¡ t
0 + · > V (q
0) ¡ t
0;
23For brevity we may refer to (t;q) as a message instead of (t;q;t;q):
32and the message
¡
b t; b q;b t;b q
¢
would be accepted by the principal.
- Therefore ts ¡qsﬂ > t0 + V
¡
q¤¢
¡V (q0) ¡ q¤ﬂ is not possible in equilibrium. Then it has
to be




¡ V (q0) ¡ q
¤ﬂ: (+)
- We also have shown that V (qs) ¡ ts > V (q0) ¡ t0 is not possible in equilibrium.
* Note that the principal accepting the renegotiation requires:
…[V (qs) ¡ ts] + (1 ¡ …)[V (q
s) ¡ t
s] ¸ …[V (q0) ¡ t0] + (1 ¡ …)[V (q
0) ¡ t
0]; (IRP)
then V (qs) ¡ ts · V (q0) ¡ t0 implies
V (qs) ¡ ts ¸ V (q0) ¡ t0: (++)
* Note that (+) and (++) together imply ts = t0 +V
¡
q¤¢
¡V (q0) and qs = q¤. To see that
replace ts in (++) with its equal from (+) to get
V (qs) ¡ qsﬂ ¸ V (q
¤) ¡ q
¤ﬂ;




* Now, (IRP), qs = q¤; and ts = t0 + V
¡
q¤¢
¡ V (q0) together imply
V (q
s) ¡ t
s ¸ V (q
0) ¡ t
0:
Since V (qs)¡ts > V (q0)¡t0 cannot hold in equilibrium, then V (qs)¡ts = V (q0)¡t0 must
hold.
* Finally, suppose V (qs) ¡ts = V (q0) ¡t0 and (ts;qs) 6= (t0 + V (qs) ¡V (q0);minfq¤;q¤g).
(Recall q¤(c0) ´
©




= V (q) ¡ [V (q0) ¡ t0]
ª
).
Consider three possible cases:
1- ts ¡ ﬂqs = t0 + V (qs) ¡ V (q0) ¡ ﬂ minfq¤;q¤g :
V (q
s) ¡ t
s = V (q
0) ¡ t
0










2- ts ¡ ﬂqs > t0 + V (qs) ¡ V (q0) ¡ ﬂ minfq¤;q¤g :
V (q
s) ¡ t
s = V (q
0) ¡ t
0
implies qs < minfq¤;q¤g: Then type ﬂ has a pro…table deviation for (accepted by the
principal) by sending the message (ts + ";minfq¤;q¤g); where " = V (minfq¤;q¤g)¡V (qs) >





s + V (minfq
¤;q
¤g) ¡ V (q
s) ¡ ﬂ minfq
¤;q
¤g
since, by assumption, qs < q¤.
3- ts ¡ ﬂqs < t0 + V (qs) ¡ V (q0) ¡ ﬂ minfq¤;q¤g :
V (q
s) ¡ t
s = V (q
0) ¡ t
0
implies qs > minfq¤;q¤g: Assume also qs · q¤:24




¤] ) V (q
s) ¡ V (minfq
¤;q








¤ﬂ ¡ [V (q
s) ¡ V (q
¤)]:
24The case of qs > q¤ can be easily ruled out as a possible equilibrium. Since qs = q¤ the incentive
compatibility constraint for low cost type can be written as




But the incentive compatibilty constraint for the high cost type requires




34Using qs = q¤; the inequality (#) implies ts ¡ qsﬂ < ts ¡ qsﬂ; which violates the incentive
compatibility constraint and, therefore, (ts;qs;ts;qs) cannot be the equilibrium outcome.
- Assume qs > q¤: Consider the alternative message (t0;q0) = (t0 + V (q¤) ¡ V (q0);q¤): The






Now ts ¡ qsﬂ ¸ ts ¡ qsﬂ and qs < q¤ imply
ts ¡ qsﬂ > t
0 ¡ q
0ﬂ;
and, therefore, the principal will assign a probability 1 to the agent sending the message






0 = V (q
s) ¡ t
s = V (q
0) ¡ t
0:
Proof of Proposition 4.
* Note that in order to satisfy (IR), principal’s expected pro…t can be at most
…[V (q
¤) ¡ q
¤ﬂ] + (1 ¡ …)[V (q
¤) ¡ q
¤ﬂ] ¡ ￿:
* With the proposed solution principal’s expected pro…t is the maximum possible:
…(V (q0) ¡ t0) + (1 ¡ …)(V (q
0) ¡ t
0) = …(V (q
¤) ¡ q





¤ﬂ] + (1 ¡ …)[V (q
¤) ¡ q
¤ﬂ] ¡ ￿
* Constraints (IC1),(IC2),(IRﬂ), (IRﬂ),(IR) and (ICI) are all satis…ed:
t0 ¡ q0ﬂ ¸ t
0 ¡ q
0ﬂ , 0 ¸ 0 (IC1)
t
0 ¡ q
0ﬂ ¸ t0 ¡ q0ﬂ , q
0(ﬂ ¡ ﬂ) ¸ q0(ﬂ ¡ ﬂ) , q
0 · q0 (IC2)
35V (q
¤) ¡ q
¤ﬂ ¡ [V (q0) ¡ t0] ¸ 0 , 0 ¸ 0 (IRﬂ)
V (q
¤) ¡ q
¤ﬂ ¡ [V (q
0) ¡ t
0] ¸ 0 (IRﬂ)
, V (q
¤) ¡ q
¤ﬂ ¡ [V (q
¤) ¡ q
¤ﬂ ¡ ￿=(1 ¡ …)] ¸ 0 , ￿ ¸ 0
￿ · …[V (q
¤) ¡ q
¤ﬂ ¡ (V (q0) ¡ t0)] + (1 ¡ …)[V (q
¤) ¡ q
¤ﬂ ¡ (V (q
0) ¡ t
0)]
, ￿ · (1 ¡ …)[￿=(1 ¡ …ﬁ)]: (IR)
Finally, note that the proposed contract satis…es the conditions of Corollary 1 and therefore
it is not renegotiated. Then, (ICI) reduces to:
…(t0 ¡ q0ﬂ) + (1 ¡ …)(t
0 ¡ q
0ﬂ) · ¡￿ + …fV (q
¤) ¡ q
¤ﬂ ¡ [V (q0) ¡ t0]g+
(1 ¡ …)fV (q
¤) ¡ q
¤ﬂ ¡ [V (q
0) ¡ t
0]g (ICI)
() (1 ¡ …)(q
0ﬂ ¡ q
0ﬂ) · ¡￿ + (1 ¡ …)fV (q
¤) ¡ q
¤ﬂ ¡ [V (q
0) ¡ q
0ﬂ]g
() (1 ¡ …)q
0(ﬂ ¡ ﬂ) · ¡￿ + (1 ¡ …)￿=(1 ¡ …) = 0:
Proof of Proposition 5. Since the pro…t function is increasing (decreasing) in ￿ when
the principal induces the agent to (not to) acquire information, all we need to prove is that
pro…ts are identical when the cost is equal to the critical value (￿¤ in Case 1 and ￿C in Case
2) and that these critical values are smaller than the expected surplus generated by the high
cost type (since Proposition 4 characterizes the optimal contract only in this situation).
Let PRh(￿) be principal’s pro…t as a function of ￿ when the contract is the one described
by Proposition 4 (the agent has hard information), and PR1
s(￿) and PR2
s(￿) principal’s pro…t
when contracts are characterized by Propositions 1 and 2 respectively (the agent only has
soft information).
Case 1 (e q0 < q0):

























(1 ¡ …)[V (q
¤) ¡ q
¤ﬂ ¡ V (q
0) + ﬂq
0] + …q





* ￿¤ < (1 ¡ …)[V (q¤) ¡ q¤ﬂ] :
1 ¡ …
2 ¡ …
f(1 ¡ …)[V (q
¤) ¡ q
¤ﬂ ¡ V (q
0) + q
0ﬂ)] + …q




(1 ¡ …)[¡V (q
0) + q
0ﬂ)] + …q









V (q¤) ¡ q¤ﬂ
1 ¡ …
;
which is satis…ed since the right hand side is positive and the left hand side is negative (note
that V 0(q0) =
ﬂ¡…ﬂ
1¡… and V 00(q) < 0 ).
Case 2 (e q0 ¸ q0):




¤ﬂ] + (1 ¡ …)[V (q
¤) ¡ q


















(1 ¡ …)[V (q
¤) ¡ q
¤ﬂ] + …e q
0(ﬂ ¡ ﬂ) ¡ (1 ¡ …)[V (e q





= (2 ¡ …)e q
0(ﬂ ¡ ﬂ)…
,
(1 ¡ …)[V (q
¤) ¡ q
¤ﬂ ¡ V (e q
0)] + (1 ¡ …)e q
0ﬂ ¡ (1 ¡ …)e q




¤ﬂ ¡ V (e q
0) + e q
0[ﬂ(1 ¡ …) + ﬂ… = 0;
where the last equality holds by the de…nition of e q0:
* ￿C < (1 ¡ …)[V (q¤) ¡ q¤ﬂ] :
e q





0(ﬂ ¡ ﬂ)… < V (e q
0) ¡ e q
0e ﬂ , 0 < V (e q
0) ¡ e q
0ﬂ:
B. Appendix: A Message Contingent Contract
Message contingent contracts a-la-Maskin-Tirole can induce e¢cient levels of production in
a full commitment case. For any level of ￿; the principal can extract all the expected surplus
([V (q¤) ¡ q¤ﬂ]… + [V (q¤) ¡ q¤ﬂ](1 ¡ …)) minus the cost ￿ (so the payo¤ for the agent would
be equal to his reservation utility) by o¤ering the following message contingent contract:
1- The agent reports to the court his cost fl;hg,
2- The principal accepts or challenges agent’s report fA;Cg,
3- If the principal challenges the report then the agent has to accept the
challenge or reject it fa;rg:
As a function of the messages, production levels, money transfers and …nes are as follow
(let f and F be the …nes the agent and the principal pay to the court):
* t(l;A) = q¤ﬂ + ￿ ; q(l;A) = q¤ ; f(l;A) = 0 ; F(l;A) = 0
* t(h;A) = q¤ﬂ + ￿ ; q(h;A) = q¤ ; f(h;A) = 0 ; F(h;A) = 0
* t(l;C;a) = q¤ﬂ + ￿ ; q(l;C;a) = q¤ ; f(l;C;a) = P0 ; F(l;C;a) = 0
* t(h;C;a) = q¤ﬂ + ￿ ; q(h;C;a) = q¤ ; f(h;C;a) = P ; F(h;C;a) = 0
38* t(l;C;r) = q¤ﬂ + ￿ ; q(l;C;r) = q¤ ; f(l;C;r) = P000 ; F(l;C;r) = Q
* t(h;C;r) = q¤ﬂ + ￿ ; q(h;C;r) = q¤ ; f(h;C;r) = P00 ; F(h;C;r) = 0;
where P;P0;P 00;P000 and Q satisfy:
(ﬂ ¡ ﬂ)q
¤ ¸ P




0 ¡ (ﬂ ¡ ﬂ)q
¤ ¸ P
000 ¸ P
0 ¡ (ﬂ ¡ ﬂ)q
¤;
Q > 0:25
When the principal o¤ers the above contract a game is de…ned where the agent has to
decide to acquire or not pre-contractual information f￿;:￿g, to accept or not the contract
fa0;r0g, to share or not the information with the principal (if he acquired it and accepted the
contract) fSh;:Shg, then to make a report to the court fh;lg and …nally, if the principal
challenges the report, to accept or reject the challenge fa;rg. Principal’s only participation
in this game is to accept or challenge agent’s report fA;Cg.
The following (informally described) strategies with any beliefs the principal may have
constitute a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium for the above game:
² Agent’s strategy:
– The agent acquires information, accepts the contract, shares it and reports truth-
fully (l if ﬂ = ﬂ; h if ﬂ = ﬂ);
– If the principal challenges the report after the agent reported truthfully, the agent
rejects the challenge;
– If the principal challenges the report after the agent reported falsely, he accepts
the challenge;
– If the agent does not acquire pre-contractual information, he still reports truth-
fully after learning his type.
² Principal’s strategy:
39– Accept if the agent reports l;
– Accept if the agent shows him ﬂ = ﬂ and the agent reports h;
– Challenge otherwise (that is when the agent reports h and he didn’t show any
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Figure C.1: Optimal Contracts when ￿ = 1
40 
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Slope = b 
Figure C.5: Renegotiation with Soft Information - Given an initial contract (t0;q0;t0;q0) the
unique outcome that satis…es the Intuitive Criterion is (ts;qs;ts;qs):
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Figure C.8: Renegotiation with Hard Information
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(t0, q0)= (t/, q/) 
q* 
Figure C.9: Optimal Contract when Inducing Information Acquisition - (t0;q0;t0;q0) when
￿ = 0 and
¡
t=;q=;t=;q=¢
when ￿ = (1 ¡ …)
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Figure C.12: Proof of Proposition 3 - ts¡qsﬂ > t¤¡q¤ﬂ ) V (qs)¡ts > V (q0) ¡ t0) or the
principal would reject the o¤er, but then a pro…table deviation (point Z) exists for the type ﬂ
agent. The Intuitive Criterion implies the principal assigns probability 1 to the agent being




equilibrium outcome that satis…es the Intuitive Criterion.
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